Yearn — yvDAI-1

Contract Addresses

Core yvDAI-1 Contracts

Contract	Address	Type
yvDAI-1 Vault	0x028eC7330ff87667b6dfb0D94b954c820195336c	Yearn V3 Vault (v3.0.2), Vyper minimal proxy
Underlying asset (DAI)	0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F	MakerDAO DAI
Accountant	0x5A74Cb32D36f2f517DB6f7b0A0591e09b22cDE69	Shared Yearn Accountant (0% mgmt, 10% perf)
Fee Recipient (Dumper)	0x590Dd9399bB53f1085097399C3265C7137c1C4Cf	Claims fees and routes to auctions/splitters

Governance Contracts (shared with all Yearn V3 risk-1 vaults)

Contract	Address	Configuration
Yearn V3 Role Manager	0xb3bd6B2E61753C311EFbCF0111f75D29706D9a41	Single instance for all category-1 vaults
Daddy / ySafe (Governance)	0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52	6-of-9 Gnosis Safe
Brain (Operations)	0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7	3-of-8 Gnosis Safe
Security	0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0	4-of-7 Gnosis Safe
Strategy Manager (Timelock)	0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336b7090767F367BF73	TimelockController — 7-day delay
Keeper	0x604e586F17cE106B64185A7a0d2c1Da5bAce711E	yHaaSRelayer — REPORTING only
Debt Allocator	0x1e9eB053228B1156831759401dE0E115356b8671	Minimal proxy — REPORTING + DEBT_MANAGER

Yearn V3 Infrastructure

Contract	Address
Vault Factory (v3.0.2)	0x444045c5C13C246e117eD36437303cac8E250aB0
Vault Original (v3.0.2)	0x1ab62413e0cf2eBEb73da7D40C70E7202ae14467

Active Strategies (2 in default queue, 2 with debt)

Default queue order at block 25073237:

#	Strategy	Name	Activation	Current Debt (DAI)	Allocation
1	0xAeDF7d5F3112552E110e5f9D08c9997Adce0b78d	DAI to USDS Depositor	2025-05-15	2,559,595.76	27.03%
2	0xfF03Dce6d95aa7a30B75EFbaFD11384221B9f9B5	DAI To USDC-1 Depositor	2025-10-24	6,908,481.99	72.97%

Last reports: DAI to USDS Depositor 2026-05-03 (last_report = 1777780343); DAI To USDC-1 Depositor 2026-05-03 (last_report = 1777777319).

Removed from queue between April 27 and May 5 (no longer in get_default_queue()):

• Savings Dai (sDAI) (0x83F20F44975D03b1b09e64809B757c47f942BEeA) — direct sDAI ERC-4626 wrapper from MakerDAO; previously zero debt
• Spark DAI Lender (0x1fd862499e9b9402DE6c599b6C391f83981180Ab) — direct supply into Spark Lend; previously zero debt
• Aave V3 DAI Lender (0x9BF50e7589a562da2ecC0a87e2597EFBDBde241B) — direct supply into Aave V3; previously zero debt

The rationale for removing all three direct-deposit fallbacks has not been independently verified. Reintroducing any of them would require a fresh addStrategy() proposal at the Strategy Manager TimelockController (7-day delay).

Strategy Protocol Dependencies (effective)

After the vault-of-vaults unwind:

Effective endpoint	Path	Effective share
Sky / sUSDS (Sky Savings Rate)	yvDAI-1 → yvUSDC-1 → USDC to sUSDS Lender (~70.9%) AND yvDAI-1 → yvUSDS-1 → sUSDS Lender (~21.6%)	~92.5%
Sky USDS Staking Rewards (SPK farm)	yvDAI-1 → yvUSDS-1 → Spark USDS Compounder → Sky USDS Staking	~5.4%
Spark Lend USDC market	yvDAI-1 → yvUSDC-1 → Spark USDC Lender → Spark Lend	~2.1%
MakerDAO PSM Lite (USDC ↔ DAI)	Used by DAI To USDC-1 Depositor for inbound DAI → USDC conversion (and reverse on withdrawal)	High during routing
Sky DAI-USDS Exchanger (DAI ↔ USDS)	Used by DAI to USDS Depositor for inbound DAI → USDS conversion (and reverse on withdrawal)	High during routing
yvUSDC-1 (intermediate vault)	72.97% of yvDAI-1 routes through it	Vault-of-vaults dependency
yvUSDS-1 (intermediate vault)	27.03% of yvDAI-1 routes through it	Vault-of-vaults dependency

Net Sky-ecosystem concentration: ~100% of deployed DAI (sUSDS + Sky USDS Staking + Spark Lend USDC market). All three endpoints are Sky / Spark contracts.

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

Yearn V3 Core Audits

Auditor	Date	Scope	Report
Statemind	May 2, 2024	V3 Vaults (v3.0.0)	PDF
ChainSecurity	May 4, 2024	V3 Vaults + Tokenized Strategy (v3.0.0)	2 PDFs
yAcademy	Jun 2024	V3 Vaults (v3.0.1)	PDF

Sky / MakerDAO Audits (Underlying Protocol)

Sky (formerly MakerDAO) is one of the most extensively audited DeFi protocols:

Auditor	Coverage	Notes
ChainSecurity	9 audits including USDS, sUSDS, PSM Lite	Core security partner
Cantina	10 audit reports including sUSDS and USDS	Comprehensive coverage
Sherlock	Public audit contest (Aug 2024)	Community audit
Trail of Bits	Core DAI system (legacy MCD)	Historical audit
PeckShield	Core DAI system (legacy MCD)	Historical audit
Quantstamp	Liquidations 2.0	Historical audit
ABDK	Vote Delegate security	Governance audit

LitePSM (used for USDC ↔ DAI conversion): audited by ChainSecurity and Cantina.

DAI-USDS Exchanger: part of the Sky Endgame stack, audited under the same umbrella.

Strategy Review Process

All strategies pass through Yearn's 12-metric risk-scoring framework (RISK_FRAMEWORK.md). yvDAI-1 is registered as Category 1 in the Role Manager (getCategory(vault) == 1), the strictest tier.

Bug Bounty

• Yearn (Immunefi): active, $200,000 max payout (Critical). https://immunefi.com/bounty/yearnfinance/
• Yearn (Sherlock): also listed at https://audits.sherlock.xyz/bug-bounties/30
• Sky / MakerDAO (Immunefi): active, $10,000,000 max payout (Critical). Scope includes DAI, USDS, sUSDS, PSM. https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/sky/
• Safe Harbor (SEAL): Yearn is not listed on the SEAL Safe Harbor registry

On-Chain Complexity

The yvDAI-1 system is moderately complex because of the vault-of-vaults composition:

• 2 funded strategies, both depositors into other Yearn V3 vaults
• Conversion hops:
  • DAI To USDC-1 Depositor: DAI → USDC (PSM Lite) → yvUSDC-1 → (97.15%) USDC into sUSDS Lender / (2.85%) USDC into Spark Lend USDC market
  • DAI to USDS Depositor: DAI → USDS (Exchanger) → yvUSDS-1 → (80.03%) USDS into sUSDS Lender / (19.97%) USDS into Spark USDS Compounder → Sky USDS Staking Rewards
• Two layers of Yearn V3 vault accounting to verify (yvDAI-1 → yvUSDC-1 or yvDAI-1 → yvUSDS-1). Neither intermediate vault chains through the other
• No leverage, no looping, no cross-chain bridging
• Standard ERC-4626 at every layer
• Vault is immutable (non-upgradeable Vyper minimal proxy)

The vault-of-vaults composition is not leverage but is a real complexity surface — a bug or accounting issue at any layer cascades. Each layer is itself ERC-4626 and on-chain verifiable.

Historical Track Record

• Vault deployed: March 12, 2024 (deployment tx) — ~26 months in production
• TVL: 9,468,077.75 DAI — well within the 50M DAI deposit limit. TVL is up ~21.1% from the May 5 snapshot of 7.82M (+1.65M absolute), reflecting fresh DAI deposits since May 5
• PPS trend: 1.000000 → 1.118469 (~11.85% cumulative return over ~26 months, ~5.4% annualized)
• Security incidents: None known for this vault or for the Yearn V3 framework
• Strategy changes: active management. Between April 27 and May 5, three direct-deposit fallbacks (sDAI, Spark DAI Lender, Aave V3 DAI Lender) were removed from the default queue (and remain absent at May 11). Between May 5 and May 11, the inbound DAI ($1.65M) was distributed with a tilt toward the USDS depositor — the depositor allocation shifted from 79.44 / 20.56 to 72.97 / 27.03 (USDC / USDS)
• Vault-of-vaults rewiring (downstream):
  • At the April 27 snapshot yvUSDC-1 routed 100% to yvUSDS-1, so yvDAI-1's effective endpoint was 100% yvUSDS-1. At the May 5 snapshot yvUSDC-1 had switched its primary route to a direct USDC to sUSDS Lender strategy
  • Between May 5 and May 11, yvUSDS-1 re-diversified: from 100% Spark USDS Compounder to 80.03% sUSDS Lender + 19.97% Spark USDS Compounder. Both intermediate vaults now route majority debt into sUSDS
  • Net effect at May 11: effective endpoint mix is ~92.5% sUSDS (sum across both paths) / ~5.4% Sky USDS Staking / ~2.1% Spark Lend USDC. Sky-ecosystem concentration is ~100% (unchanged in principle), but the sUSDS share has grown from ~77.5% → ~92.5% and the USDS Staking share has contracted from ~20.6% → ~5.4% as a direct consequence of yvUSDS-1's downstream re-diversification
• Yearn V3 track record: V3 framework has been live since May 2024 (~24 months). No V3 vault exploits

Yearn protocol TVL: ~$197.5M total across all chains (DeFiLlama, April 2026).

Sky / sUSDS / USDS Staking track record: see the yvUSDS-1 report for the underlying-protocol details — yvDAI-1 inherits the same dependency profile via the depositor strategies.

Funds Management

yvDAI-1 deploys ~99.9999% of its DAI via two depositor strategies. Both terminate inside the Sky ecosystem (sUSDS dominantly + Sky USDS Staking + a small Spark Lend USDC slice).

Strategy 1: DAI To USDC-1 Depositor (72.97% allocation)

Contract: 0xfF03Dce6d95aa7a30B75EFbaFD11384221B9f9B5 — verified vault target 0xBe53A109B494E5c9f97b9Cd39Fe969BE68BF6204 (yvUSDC-1).

Pipeline:

1. DAI → USDC via MakerDAO PSM Lite (0xf6e72Db5454dd049d0788e411b06CfAF16853042) — 1:1 at 0% fee (tin = tout = 0)
2. USDC → yvUSDC-1 deposit (ERC-4626)
3. yvUSDC-1 internally routes ~97.15% to its USDC to sUSDS Lender strategy (0x7130570BCEfCedBe9d15B5b11A33006156460f8f) → USDC → USDS (or sUSDS-internal conversion) → sUSDS, plus ~2.85% to its Spark USDC Lender strategy (0x25f893276544d86a82b1ce407182836F45cb6673) → direct supply into Spark Lend USDC market

Withdrawal: reverse path. The user's redeem on yvDAI-1 triggers withdraw from this strategy → redeem from yvUSDC-1 → withdraw from yvUSDC-1's downstream (sUSDS Lender or Spark USDC Lender) → unwind into USDC → DAI via PSM. All atomic in the same transaction.

Strategy parameters:

• Activated: 2025-10-24
• Last reported: 2026-05-03 (last_report = 1777777319)
• PSM fee fallback: 0.05% threshold (above which the strategy can be configured to use Uniswap V3 with 0.5% slippage tolerance)

Strategy 2: DAI to USDS Depositor (27.03% allocation)

Contract: 0xAeDF7d5F3112552E110e5f9D08c9997Adce0b78d — verified vault target 0x182863131F9a4630fF9E27830d945B1413e347E8 (yvUSDS-1).

Pipeline:

1. DAI → USDS via Sky DAI-USDS Exchanger (0x3225737a9Bbb6473CB4a45b7244ACa2BeFdB276A) — 1:1, no fee
2. USDS → yvUSDS-1 deposit (ERC-4626)
3. yvUSDS-1 currently routes 80.03% to its sUSDS Lender strategy (0x3F2dE801629116A83B9734bB72012A554e01CfC1) → direct deposit into Sky's sUSDS (Sky Savings Rate), plus 19.97% to its Spark USDS Compounder strategy (0xc9f01b5c6048B064E6d925d1c2d7206d4fEeF8a3) → Sky USDS Staking Rewards (SPK farm)

Withdrawal: reverse path. The user's redeem on yvDAI-1 triggers withdraw from this strategy → redeem from yvUSDS-1 → unwind from whichever yvUSDS-1 leg the redemption hits in queue order (sUSDS Lender then Spark Compounder). All atomic in the same transaction.

Strategy parameters:

• Activated: 2025-05-15
• Last reported: 2026-05-03 (last_report = 1777780343)

Removed from default queue (between April 27 and May 5)

• Savings Dai (sDAI) (0x83F20F44975D03b1b09e64809B757c47f942BEeA) — direct ERC-4626 wrapper from MakerDAO; previously zero debt
• Spark DAI Lender (0x1fd862499e9b9402DE6c599b6C391f83981180Ab) — direct supply into Spark Lend; previously zero debt
• Aave V3 DAI Lender (0x9BF50e7589a562da2ecC0a87e2597EFBDBde241B) — direct supply into Aave V3; previously zero debt

The removal of all three direct-deposit fallbacks eliminates the on-chain single-hop alternatives that were available at the prior snapshot. Reintroducing any of them now requires a fresh addStrategy() proposal at the Strategy Manager TimelockController (7-day delay). Rationale for the removals has not been independently verified.

Accessibility

• Deposits: Permissionless ERC-4626. Subject to 50M DAI deposit limit
• Withdrawals: ERC-4626. Atomic, but unwinds through up to three vault layers + Sky / Spark unstaking
• No cooldown or lock period
• Fees: 0% management, 10% performance
• Profit unlock: 10 days

Collateralization

• 100% on-chain DAI backing. All deposits are DAI; deployed DAI ends up as USDS at the terminal layer (yvUSDS-1) but the unwind always returns DAI 1:1
• Collateral quality: ultimately backed by Sky's over-collateralized loan book + RWA Treasury bills (via USDS / sUSDS / USDS Staking Rewards) — see yvUSDS-1 report for full underlying details
• No leverage — vault-of-vaults composition is not leverage
• All positions are fully redeemable via the reverse pipeline

Provability

• PPS: ERC-4626, fully algorithmic
• Strategy totalAssets(): reads the underlying yvUSDC-1 / yvUSDS-1 share balance and converts via ERC-4626 convertToAssets() — fully on-chain, real-time
• Multi-layer verification: anyone can independently verify yvDAI-1 → yvUSDC-1 → (sUSDS or Spark Lend USDC) and yvDAI-1 → yvUSDS-1 → Spark USDS Compounder on-chain. Each layer's exchange rate is its own ERC-4626 calculation
• Profit / loss reporting: keepers via process_report(), profits unlock over 10 days

The vault-of-vaults adds a small surface area to verify (multiple totalAssets() reads) but does not add any off-chain dependency.

Liquidity Risk

• Primary exit: Redeem yvDAI-1 for DAI via ERC-4626 withdraw() / redeem(). Triggers reverse pipeline through yvUSDC-1 / yvUSDS-1 (atomic, multi-step in the same transaction)
• Highly liquid underlying: sUSDS holds multi-billion TVL; USDS Staking Rewards has multi-billion USDS staked. yvDAI-1's ~$9.47M is a tiny fraction of underlying capacity
• PSM liquidity: MakerDAO PSM Lite provides deep DAI ↔ USDC liquidity at 1:1, 0% fee. PSM capacity is managed by Sky governance and typically holds billions of USDC
• Cascading withdrawal mechanics: both depositor paths traverse two Yearn V3 vault layers (yvDAI-1 → yvUSDC-1 or yvDAI-1 → yvUSDS-1) plus the terminal unstake (sUSDS withdrawal, Spark Lend supply withdrawal, or Spark Compounder unwind). Neither intermediate vault chains through the other, so the cascade is bounded at two Yearn-vault layers. All steps execute atomically in the same transaction
• No DEX liquidity needed — exit is via Sky's own contracts (PSM, Exchanger, sUSDS, USDS Staking) and Spark Lend
• Same-value asset: DAI-denominated vault token — no price-divergence risk
• No withdrawal queue or cooldown — atomic redemption
• Deposit limit: 50M DAI cap vs ~$9.47M TVL (room for +428%)

The cascading multi-layer withdrawal is atomic but has a higher gas cost than a single-strategy vault. For a large institutional withdrawal, the gas of unwinding through both layers plus the terminal Sky / Spark unstakes should be considered when sizing the redemption.

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

Position	Address	Threshold	Roles on Vault
Daddy (ySafe)	0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52	6-of-9	12 of 14 vault roles
Brain	0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7	3-of-8	QUEUE, REPORTING, DEBT, MAX_DEBT, DEPOSIT_LIMIT, WITHDRAW_LIMIT, PROFIT_UNLOCK, DEBT_PURCHASER, EMERGENCY
Security	0xe5e2Baf96198c56380dDD5E992D7d1ADa0e989c0	4-of-7	DEBT, MAX_DEBT, EMERGENCY
Strategy Manager (Timelock)	0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336b7090767F367BF73	7-day delay	ADD_STRATEGY, REVOKE_STRATEGY, FORCE_REVOKE, ACCOUNTANT, MAX_DEBT
Keeper	0x604e586F17cE106B64185A7a0d2c1Da5bAce711E	Bot	REPORTING only
Debt Allocator	0x1e9eB053228B1156831759401dE0E115356b8671	Bot	REPORTING + DEBT_MANAGER

ySafe 6-of-9 signers include publicly known DeFi contributors — see Yearn Multisig Info.

Properties:

1. No EOA holds vault roles directly
2. Strategy additions and accountant changes pass through 7-day timelock
3. Self-governed timelock — TIMELOCK_ADMIN belongs to the timelock itself
4. Vault contract is immutable — Vyper minimal proxy
5. Same governance pattern across 37+ vaults

Programmability

• PPS: ERC-4626, fully algorithmic at every vault layer
• Vault operations: permissionless deposit / withdraw on-chain
• Strategy reporting: automated via keeper at every vault layer
• Debt allocation: Debt Allocator (automated) + Brain (manual) at every vault layer
• Off-chain inputs: none

External Dependencies

After resolving the vault-of-vaults composition, yvDAI-1's effective dependencies are:

Dependency	Criticality	Notes
yvUSDC-1 (intermediate vault)	Critical — 72.97% of deployed funds route through it	Same governance, audits, code as yvDAI-1. See yvUSDC-1 report
yvUSDS-1 (intermediate vault)	Critical — 27.03% of deployed funds route through it	Same governance, audits, code. See yvUSDS-1 report
Sky / sUSDS (Sky Savings Rate)	Critical — ~92.5% of effective deployment (via both intermediate vaults)	Multi-billion sUSDS TVL, $10M Immunefi bounty
Sky USDS Staking Rewards (SPK farm)	Moderate — ~5.4% of effective deployment (via yvUSDS-1)	First-party Sky contract; share dropped from ~20.6% on May 5 as yvUSDS-1 re-diversified into sUSDS
Spark Lend USDC market	Low — ~2.1% of effective deployment (via yvUSDC-1)	Sky sub-DAO; audited
MakerDAO PSM Lite	High during routing (used by yvUSDC-1 path)	1:1, 0% fee, audited
Sky DAI-USDS Exchanger	High during routing (used by yvUSDS-1 path)	1:1, no fee, audited
DAI / USDS / USDC tokens	Critical	Inherited from each conversion hop

Dependency quality: all dependencies are top-tier — Sky / MakerDAO infrastructure plus Yearn V3 itself. The vault-of-vaults composition concentrates dependency on the Sky ecosystem (~100% of effective deployment across sUSDS + USDS Staking + Spark Lend USDC, with ~92.5% in sUSDS alone) and on Yearn V3's own vault accounting working correctly across two layers.

Operational Risk

• Team: Yearn Finance — established 2020, public contributors, named multisig signers
• Vault management: Standard Yearn V3 Role Manager pattern shared across 37+ vaults
• Documentation: Comprehensive Yearn V3 documentation. All strategy code verified on Etherscan
• Legal: Yearn BORG via YIP-87
• Incident response: 4 historical V1 events handled. V3 framework not yet stress-tested by an exploit
• V3 immutability: vault cannot be upgraded — eliminates proxy upgrade risk but means a critical bug requires deploying a new vault
• Vault-of-vaults operational consideration: because yvDAI-1's funded strategies all depend on yvUSDC-1 / yvUSDS-1 being healthy, an emergency action on either upstream vault (e.g. shutdown, deposit pause) directly impacts yvDAI-1

Monitoring

Existing Monitoring Infrastructure

Yearn maintains the monitoring repository with active alerting. yvDAI-1 is in the monitored vault list:

• Large flow alerts (yearn/alert_large_flows.py) — runs hourly via GitHub Actions
• Endorsed vault check (yearn/check_endorsed.py) — weekly
• Timelock monitoring (timelock/timelock_alerts.py)

Key Contracts

Contract	Address	Monitor
yvDAI-1 Vault	0x028eC7330ff87667b6dfb0D94b954c820195336c	PPS, totalAssets(), totalDebt(), totalIdle(), Deposit / Withdraw events
DAI to USDC-1 Depositor	0xfF03Dce6d95aa7a30B75EFbaFD11384221B9f9B5	totalAssets(), isShutdown(), keeper report
DAI to USDS Depositor	0xAeDF7d5F3112552E110e5f9D08c9997Adce0b78d	totalAssets(), isShutdown(), keeper report
yvUSDC-1 (upstream dependency)	0xBe53A109B494E5c9f97b9Cd39Fe969BE68BF6204	PPS, shutdown state
yvUSDS-1 (upstream dependency)	0x182863131F9a4630fF9E27830d945B1413e347E8	PPS, shutdown state
MakerDAO PSM Lite	0xf6e72Db5454dd049d0788e411b06CfAF16853042	tin, tout (fee parameters)
Sky DAI-USDS Exchanger	0x3225737a9Bbb6473CB4a45b7244ACa2BeFdB276A	Pause state
ySafe (Daddy)	0xFEB4acf3df3cDEA7399794D0869ef76A6EfAff52	Signer / threshold changes

Critical Events to Monitor

• PPS decrease at any of the three vaults in scope (yvDAI-1, yvUSDC-1, yvUSDS-1) — should only increase outside of explicit loss events
• Strategy additions / removals at any layer
• Emergency actions (Shutdown) at any layer — directly impacts yvDAI-1's redemption path
• PSM tin / tout — if non-zero, USDC ↔ DAI conversion incurs fees
• DAI-USDS Exchanger pause state
• Sky USDS Staking Rewards pause / migration (affects ~5.4% of effective deployment via yvUSDS-1)
• Sky sUSDS pause / migration (affects ~92.5% of effective deployment via both intermediate vaults — dominant exposure)
• Spark Lend USDC market freeze / pause (affects ~2.1% of effective deployment via yvUSDC-1)
• ySafe / Brain / Security signer or threshold changes

Monitoring Functions

Function	Contract	Purpose	Frequency
convertToAssets(1e18)	yvDAI-1	PPS	Every 6 hours
convertToAssets(1e6)	yvUSDC-1	Upstream PPS	Every 6 hours
convertToAssets(1e18)	yvUSDS-1	Terminal PPS	Every 6 hours
totalAssets()	All three vaults	TVL	Daily
tin() / tout()	PSM Lite	PSM fee	Daily
live()	DAI-USDS Exchanger	Exchanger active	Daily
getThreshold() / getOwners()	ySafe	Governance integrity	Weekly
getMinDelay()	ySafe	Delay change detection	Weekly

Reassessment Triggers

• Time-based: Reassess in 6 months (November 2026) or annually
• TVL-based: Reassess if TVL exceeds $25M or changes by ±50%, or if the deposit limit is changed
• Strategy posture:
  • any new addStrategy() proposal at the Strategy Manager TimelockController for yvDAI-1 (would surface in the 7-day queue) — particularly if it reintroduces direct sDAI / Spark DAI Lender / Aave V3 DAI Lender exposure
  • the depositor allocation between yvUSDC-1 and yvUSDS-1 swings by more than ±20 percentage points from the current 72.97 / 27.03 split
• Downstream rewiring (the dominant change vector at recent snapshots):
  • if yvUSDC-1 reroutes materially away from its current USDC to sUSDS Lender strategy, yvDAI-1's effective endpoint mix changes accordingly — ~70.9 percentage points of the sUSDS share is inherited from yvUSDC-1
  • if yvUSDS-1 rewires its current 80.03 / 19.97 sUSDS Lender / Spark Compounder split, yvDAI-1's secondary exposure changes accordingly — ~21.6 percentage points of the sUSDS share and the entire ~5.4% USDS Staking share are inherited from yvUSDS-1
  • historical note: between May 5 and May 11, the Morpho Yearn USDC Compounder (0xf1784A1bF0cBDE0F868838Dd093E65215343c4C0) — added to yvUSDC-1's queue on 2026-04-30 with 0 debt — was revoked (activation = 0 at block 25073237). The potential Morpho re-diversification leg has been removed. Reintroducing it would require a fresh addStrategy() proposal at the yvUSDC-1 Strategy Manager TimelockController (7-day delay)
• Vault-of-vaults composition:
  • reassess if a new strategy is added that creates a third Yearn-vault layer (the cascade is currently 2 layers deep)
  • reassess if any of the two intermediate vaults (yvUSDC-1, yvUSDS-1) shuts down a strategy that holds yvDAI-1's deployed funds
• Sky-specific:
  • SSR drops below 2% (may indicate Sky-side stress)
  • PSM tin / tout set above 0.05% (activates Uniswap V3 fallback in the USDC depositor path)
  • SPK reward rate changes materially or USDS Staking Rewards is paused / migrated
  • DAI-USDS Exchanger pause
  • Spark Lend USDC market freeze / pause (affects ~2.1% of effective deployment via yvUSDC-1)
• Incident-based: any V3 exploit, strategy loss, governance compromise, or major incident at Sky / MakerDAO / Spark
• Governance-based: ySafe / Brain / Security signer or threshold changes; any change to the timelock delay (would itself require 7 days)

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Appendix: Contract Architecture

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          VAULT LAYER 1                                   │
│                                                                          │
│  ┌────────────────────────┐                                             │
│  │  yvDAI-1 (v3.0.2)      │                                             │
│  │  ERC-4626, immutable    │                                             │
│  │  0x028e…336c            │                                             │
│  │                         │                                             │
│  │  ~$9.47M DAI TVL        │                                             │
│  └───┬───────────────┬─────┘                                             │
│      │ 72.97%        │ 27.03%                                            │
│      ▼               ▼                                                    │
│  ┌────────────┐  ┌─────────────────┐                                    │
│  │ DAI→USDC-1 │  │ DAI→USDS        │                                    │
│  │ Depositor  │  │ Depositor       │                                    │
│  │ 0xfF03…f9B5│  │ 0xAeDF…b78d     │                                    │
│  └────┬───────┘  └────────┬────────┘                                    │
│       │                   │                                              │
│  ┌────▼─────────┐    ┌────▼──────────────────┐                          │
│  │ DAI→USDC     │    │ DAI→USDS              │                          │
│  │ via PSM Lite │    │ via DAI-USDS Exchanger│                          │
│  │ 1:1, 0 fee   │    │ 1:1, no fee           │                          │
│  └────┬─────────┘    └────┬──────────────────┘                          │
└───────┼───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
        │                   │
        ▼                   ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          VAULT LAYER 2 (TERMINAL Yearn layer)            │
│                                                                          │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────┐    ┌────────────────────────────┐      │
│  │  yvUSDC-1                   │    │  yvUSDS-1                  │      │
│  │  0xBe53…6204                │    │  0x1828…47E8               │      │
│  │  ~97.15% sUSDS Lender       │    │  80.03% sUSDS Lender       │      │
│  │   ~2.85% Spark USDC Lender  │    │  19.97% Spark USDS Compounder│    │
│  │  USDS Depositor: 0 USDC     │    │  (Sky USDS Staking / SPK)  │      │
│  └─────────┬───────────────────┘    └─────────┬──────────────────┘      │
│            │                                   │                          │
│            ▼                                   ▼                          │
│   sUSDS (Sky Savings Rate)             sUSDS + Sky USDS Staking Rewards │
│   + Spark Lend USDC market             (SPK farm)                       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Effective endpoint mix for yvDAI-1's deployed DAI (May 11, 2026):
  ~92.5%  Sky sUSDS         (combined: yvUSDC-1→sUSDS Lender ~70.9% + yvUSDS-1→sUSDS Lender ~21.6%)
  ~5.4%   Sky USDS Staking   (via yvUSDS-1 → Spark USDS Compounder)
  ~2.1%   Spark Lend USDC    (via yvUSDC-1 → Spark USDC Lender)

Appendix: TimelockController Role Structure

TimelockController 0x88Ba032be87d5EF1fbE87336b7090767F367BF73 — same timelock used by 37+ Yearn V3 vaults including all six mainnet risk-1 vaults. getMinDelay() = 604800 (7 days).

Role	Holder	Type	Notes
DEFAULT_ADMIN	No holder	—	Never granted (admin = address(0))
TIMELOCK_ADMIN	Timelock itself	Contract	Self-governed
PROPOSER	Daddy/ySafe	6-of-9 Safe	Sole proposer
EXECUTOR	Daddy/ySafe	6-of-9 Safe	Direct execution
EXECUTOR	TimelockExecutor 0xf8f60bf9456a6e0141149db2dd6f02c60da5779b	Contract	Wrapper: Brain (3/8) + deployer EOA can call execute() through it
CANCELLER	Daddy/ySafe	6-of-9 Safe	Cancel pending proposals
CANCELLER	Brain	3-of-8 Safe	Cancel pending proposals

To shorten the delay, Daddy 6/9 must propose updateDelay(), wait 7 days during which Brain or Daddy can cancel, then execute. DEFAULT_ADMIN was never granted, so no party can self-grant PROPOSER or TIMELOCK_ADMIN to skip the flow.